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Abstract
If, due to some catastrophe, our classical commu-
nication system is destroyed but quantum entan-
gled state survived, in that entanglement age, it is
widely believed, the whole world would be commu-
nication less. It is discussed that complete entan-
glement based communication even with security is
possible in that scenario. In this context, the notion
of cheating-free Bell’s inequality test is introduced.
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Not long before, entanglement, the enigmatic feature of quantum
correlation [1,2], was believed to be useful only to address the inter-
pretational aspect of quantum mechanics. But things have changed
after the discovery of quantum cryptography [3-5], quantum com-
putation [6-7], dense coding [8] and teleportation [9]. Now entan-
glement is the part and parcel of quantum information.
Deutsch, in his foundational paper on quantum computation,
obliquely suggested [6] that quantum entanglement can be used
to generate quantum key, discovered by Bennett and Brassard [4].
Bennett and Brassard used disentangled state in their BB84 quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) scheme, so Deutsch’s suggestion was
striking. Ekert elaborated Deutsch’s suggestion and pointed out
[5] Bell’s theorem [2] can be used to test eavesdropping. Although
practical utilization of Bell’s theorem is conceptually interesting
but it has been soon clear [10] that avoiding Bell’s inequality test
one can use EPR correlation [1] to detect eavesdropping. Be that
as it may, finally it has been settled that EPR and non EPR quan-
tum cryptosystems (i.e. entanglement and disentanglement based
systems) are two different kind of system however they have same
physical property - the ability to expose clandestine eavesdropping.
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin carried out a comparative study
[10] on entanglement and disentanglement based quantum cryp-
tosystems. They concluded that only difference is that random data
are jointly chosen by legitimate users in disentanglement based sys-
tem but in entanglement based system, random data spontaneously
originates due to the measurements. In entanglement based cryp-
tosystem key does not exist - not even in the mind of legitimate
users until measurement is performed. If sender has no control
over the random data arising from entanglement based cryptosys-
tem then it can be assumed that completely entanglement based
secure communication is impossible.
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But if we are not interested about security can we get completely
entanglement based communication ? Such possibility is recently
ruled out by Bennett and Divincenzo [11]. They assume: ”entan-
glement by itself can not be used to transmit a classical message”.
It means entanglement could not produce meaningful data, which
is needed to send a classical message over an entirely entanglement
based channel. We shall see the above assumptions do not hold
good for our information processing technique [12] because entan-
glement can be manipulated to produce meaningful data. That is,
the power of entanglement in quantum information processing is
surprisingly underestimated.
Let us recall the technique. The two different sequences of quan-
tum states (say, S0 and S1) represent bit 0 and 1. The information
regarding two sequences is initially secretly shared between the le-
gitimate users. Repeatedly and randomly using these two sequences
arbitrarily long string of bits can be generated. Now we shall use
entangled state to prepare the two sequences.
Suppose Alice has a personal database which contains mean-
ingful data. She wants to transmit the database to her partner
Bob stationed at far off distance only using entangled states. Sup-
pose Alice possesses a stockpile of EPR pairs. The n pairs (n is a
moderately large number) can be arranged in two different ways to
represent bit 0 and 1.
Suppose S1 = {A, B, b, C, D, a, E, F, e, f, d, c, ......}
and S0 = {A, B, C, c, D, a, b, E, F, e, f, d, ......}.
Here ”A-a”, ”B-b”, ”C-c”, ”D-d”, ”E-e” and”F-f” denote EPR
pairs.
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The quantum key KQ will be :


A B b C D a E F e f d c ....
A B C c D a b E F e f d ....
A B C c D a b E F e f d ....
A B b C D a E F e f d c ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....
A B C c D a b E F e f d ....


≡


1
0
0
1
.
.
.
0


The quantum state of the pairs can be describes as,
|ψ〉2ni,j=1 = 1/
√
2(|↑〉1i |↓〉2j − |↓〉1i |↑〉2j), where i and j (i 6= j) denote
the position of any pair in the two arrangements which are not
very close to each other. The information regarding the two ar-
rangements (S0 and S1) is initially secretly shared between them.
If Alice wants to send bit 0 from her database, she arranges n
pairs according to S0 and send that sequence to Bob. Similarly she
can send bit 1 by sending S1. Bob can easily recover the bit values
from the incoming sequences by correlating the shared information
regarding the two probable arrangements with the outcome of his
sequence of measurements.
Let us describe a simple recovery of the bit value assuming (for
clarity) only one type of the sequence is sent by Alice. Bob first re-
ceives the sequence of EPR particles and stores them in a quantum
memory-cum-register. He sorts out n/2 pairs assuming they belong
to S0 and keep the n/2 pairs in (n/2) × 2 memory array marked
0. The remaining n/2 pairs (say n is even number)are assumed to
belong to S1 and kept in (n/2)×2 memory array marked 1. At this
stage she does not know which identification is right. He measures
the spin in vertical direction on EPR pairs ( each pair is kept in a
row). If the sequence is S0, then the results corresponding to rows
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of the array marked 0 will be either ↑ and ↓ or ↓ and ↑. But the
results, corresponding to the rows of array marked 1, will be four
types; 1) ↑ and ↓, 2) ↓ and ↑, 3) ↑ and ↑ 4) ↓ and ↓. As array
marked 0 only contains EPR data so bit 0 is recovered. If S1 is
sent then array marked 1 will contain EPR data. Thus Alice can
sent bit 0 or 1 according to her wish and Bob can recover the bit
values. It means the complete entanglement based communication
is possible. Next we shall discuss how this communication can be
made secure.
Eavesdropper’s problem is identical to what she encountered in
our disentanglement based QKD scheme [12]. He/she can not ex-
tract the bit value from a single copy of any sequences [13]. As our
scheme is based on repetition, eavesdropper, extracting bit values,
can evade detection if proper security criterion is not imposed. The
security criterion is: bit by bit security. In this criterion, Alice will
send the next bit after being informed by Bob that the previous one
has not been corrupted by eavesdropper. This test needs two-way
communications which simultaneously give authentication [12]. If
the bit is not corrupted Bob can inform Alice by sending any of the
two sequences. It is not necessary to send back the same bit value
sequence what Bob has got.
Note that, if security is not necessary, initial sharing of in-
formation is also not needed. Bob can recover the message by
correlating the results of randomly incoming identical sequences
representing identical bit values. The concept of secret sharing
of random data was first introduced by Vernam in classical cryp-
tography [14]. But the problem of that classical code is that the
same shared information can not be again and again used. On the
other hand, in our scheme, repetition of the quantum sequence is
simply possible because each sequence can be made secure by the
no-cloning/uncertainty principle.
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The above protocol can also be used as three party protocol
involving Alice (sender), Bob and Sonu (receivers). In three party
protocol each of the two receivers - Bob and Sonu - will get one of
the EPR particles of each pair belonging to any of the two arrange-
ments. Let us take an example.
SBob
0
= {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, , ......}
SSonu
0
= {b, g, a c, d, f, e.......}.
The above two arrangements are representing bit 0. Bob is given
the first arrangement and Sonu is given the second arrangement.
If they co operate, they could recover the bit 0. Similarly their
co-operation will be required to recover the bit 1. This is actually
entanglement based alternative message splitting [15,16] protocol.
The encoding is described for two-particle entangled state, al-
though many-particle entangled state can be used. So far security
is concerned which type of entangled state should be chosen in a
sequence of n particles ? For example: 200 three-particle or 300
two-particle entangled states ? Next we shall discuss that the ques-
tion is related to an ignored part of security of quantum encryption.
It is said that in quantum encryption, eavesdropper is bound
to introduce errors due to no-cloning principle. In strict sense,
this statement is incorrect. Eavesdropper has nonzero probability
( but extremely small) of success in guessing the entire encoding.
In other words, we can say that quantum states, used for encoding,
can be perfectly cloned with non-zero probability by the eavesdrop-
per. Hence eavesdropper can evade detection with some non-zero
probability. In quantum fashion, the success of perfect guess can
be described as an entanglement of eavesdropper’s mind with users’
minds. After all quantum mechanics cannot resist two mind beat-
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ing in unison for a while, since law of probability allows it. If we
think the existence of many many eavesdroppers then this guess-
strategy may work for one of the eavesdroppers. Then there will
be no errors due to the measurements of that eavesdropper. So, we
should protect the system against such wild strategy. This is pos-
sible because probability of success depends on how many different
ways a particular encryption can be executed. For our encryption it
simply depends on the permutation of the quantum states. There-
fore it is easy to enhance the security (say, inner layer of security)
of our encryption. Let us see how many different ways the parti-
cles can be arranged. If n is the total number of particles in each
sequence and r is the number of particles in an entangled state,
the number of distinguishable arrangements (they can be distin-
guished by measurements if many copies of the same arrangement
are given) is n!/r!n/r, where n is a factor of r. Eavesdropper’s chance
of correct guess is pr = r!
n/r/n!. Now we shall see that for fixed n,
two-particle entangled state is the best choice to enhance the inner
layer of security.
Suppose n particle sequence is composed either by x copies of
two-particle entangled states or y copies of r-particle entangled
states. Assume, two-particle is the best choice. Then pr/p2 =
r!y/2x = r!2x/r/2x > 1. It follows 2 log r!¿ r log 2. This identity is
always true. So two-particle is the best choice. Note that, in clas-
sical encryption we do not have this kind of choice. Choice is made
due to the indistinguishability of quantum particles forming entan-
glement. For our encoding the issues like channel capacity, entropy
and statistical distinguishability can be further investigated.
From Ekert’s work it is known that EPR based cryptosystem
can be protected by Bell’s theorem. But the problem is: violation
or no-violation of Bell’s inequality is not necessarily mean a genuine
test of entanglement. Using disentangled states (BB-84 states[2])
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Bell’s inequality can be tested[17]. By standard meaning, this is
a fake Bell’s inequality test. Suppose Bell’s inequality is tested by
two distant experimentalists. In that case, it is widely believed
[18,20] that there is no way to know whether the test is real or
fake because there is no way to know whether they share genuine
entangled state or not. If it be so, experimental falsification of
hidden variables under Einstein’s locality condition [1] is perhaps
incomplete to an experimentalist because he/she can be cheated by
other remote experimentalist participating in that test [19]. In the
cheating case, pseudo hidden variable takes the place of hypothet-
ical local hidden variable. Next we shall discuss that cheating-free
test is simply possible.
The problem can be attacked in two ways - the so-called test can
be done either by one experimentalist or by two experimentalists
described below.:
Cheating free test by one experimentalist:
1. Alice sends a particular sequence of EPR particles to Bob.
2. Taking half of the particles, Bob measures the EPR correlation.
3. If he gets perfect correlation then, with remaining particles he
can himself perform the test at two distant corners of a big labora-
tory.
This protocol can serve as quantum cryptosystem if two shared
arrangements of entangled states are used. If two secret arrange-
ments are used then Bob cannot get perfectly correlated EPR data
due to eavesdropping even when Alice is honest.
Cheating free test by two distant experimentalists:
1. Alice sends a sequence of EPR particles from each EPR pair to
Bob.
2. Bob seeks some of the partner EPR particles from Alice.
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3. Alice sends particles to Bob according to his demand.
4. Bob measures the EPR correlation on those pairs.
If he gets perfect correlation in EPR data (statistics should be
high), he can trust the other particles. Alice cannot deceive Bob as
he does not know which particles (events) will be sought and which
basis will be chosen to measure the EPR correlation by Bob. If Alice
sends ”fake” states in the first round she could not create entangled
state in second round. Therefore, genuine EPR states can be shared
in this way. (They can use them for secure ideal quantum coin toss-
ing which is also believed to be impossible [20]). They can proceed
for the inequality test with these remaining shared EPR pairs. But
there is a loophole. They can cheat each other when they reveal
results and basis/angles of measurements. After Alice’s discloser of
results and angles of measurements, Bob can easily reveal ”fake”
results and the corresponding ”fake” angles of measurements with
out going through any measurements in order to show violation or
no violation of Bell’s inequality to Alice. Same thing Alice can do
if Bob reveals results first. Cheating -free test can be executed by
additional steps.
After being sure they share genuine entangled states, the pro-
tocol can be extended in the following manner:
5. Alice will ask Bob to reveal the results and basis of measure-
ments of half of his genuine particles.
6. Bob meets the demand of Alice.
7. Getting the information from Bob, Alice chooses some particles
to test the EPR correlation. 8. If she gets perfect correlation, she
proceeds for the inequality test.
Note that Bob does not know which event and basis will be
chosen by Alice to measure the EPR correlation. That’s why the
test will be a genuine test. Similarly Bob can be sure about the
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validity of the test just by asking Alice to reveal the results and
basis of measurements of the remaining shared particles. Of course
this time Bob will not reveal anything but only measure according
to the revealed data. It is trivial to mention that the cheating-free
test is simply a cheating-free test not experimentally loopholes-free
test which is yet to performed. In the light of cheating-free test,
the issue of loopholes- free test can be investigated.
Note added: So far we didn’t consider noise. Security of our alter-
native QKD protocols in presence of noise is an open and interesting
problem.
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